Nevada makes you give your name, and caps the stop at 60 minutes

NRS 171.123(1) allows a detention where circumstances "reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime or civil infraction." Subsection 2 adds a separate trigger for a person the officer reasonably believes has violated the conditions of parole or probation. The civil infraction wording is recent: the section history line records an amendment at 2021, 3353, the same session that built Nevada's civil infraction process at NRS 484A.703 to 484A.705 and moved most minor traffic offences out of the criminal courts. Subsection 5 pins the term to the definition in NRS 481.015.

Subsection 3 is the operative sentence, and it cuts in both directions. It limits the detention to ascertaining "the person's identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the person's presence abroad," then imposes the identification duty while expressly removing any duty to answer anything else. Questions about where you are going, what is in a bag, who you were with or where you have been carry no statutory answer requirement in Nevada. The duty attaches to a person the officer has detained under this section; the statute says nothing about a voluntary roadside conversation.

Nevada's statute does not mention identification documents anywhere. When the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed it in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, decided 21 June 2004 on review of 118 Nev. 868, the syllabus recorded that the Nevada Supreme Court "has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce a driver's license or any other document." Behind the wheel the answer is different, and it comes from a different chapter: NRS 483.350 requires every licensee to keep the licence in immediate possession while driving and to "manually surrender the license for examination, upon demand, to a justice of the peace, a peace officer, or a deputy of the Department." That same section blocks a conviction if the driver later produces a licence that was valid at the time of the demand, either in court or at the arresting officer's office.

Subsection 4 draws two hard edges around the stop. A person "must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes," and the detention "must not extend beyond the place or the immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first effected, unless the person is arrested." NRS 171.1231 supplies the exit in both directions: at any time after the onset of the detention the person shall be arrested if probable cause appears, and if inquiry into the circumstances that prompted the detention produces no probable cause, "such person shall be released."

What an officer may do with his or her hands during that hour is governed by NRS 171.1232, not by NRS 171.123. A frisk is permitted only where the officer reasonably believes the detainee is armed with a dangerous weapon and is a threat to the officer or another, and only "to the extent reasonably necessary to ascertain the presence of such weapon." Subsection 2 of that section is an express statutory exclusionary rule: nothing seized in such a search is admissible in any proceeding unless the search complied with the section. NRS 484A.7033(1)(a) routes traffic stops back into all of this, letting an officer who has halted a driver for a civil infraction escalate to a NRS 171.123 detention "if circumstances exist that warrant such a detention." A detention under NRS 171.123 also unlocks NRS 179.1152, which lets an officer who has lawfully obtained a prepaid or stored value card, and has probable cause that it represents the proceeds of a crime, use an electronic device to read the name and balance on it.

123 states the duty but sets no penalty of its own. 087. If a firearm is used in the course of the resistance, or the person takes or tries to take a firearm from the officer, it rises to a category C felony; with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm it is a category D felony. 100 makes it a misdemeanor for any person wilfully to fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer enforcing chapters 484A to 484E of NRS.

1231 requires release once inquiry shows no probable cause. 1232 standard is barred by that section's own subsection 2, which is the only express statutory suppression rule in this part of the chapter.